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ABSTRACT
The need for structural reforms in the euro area 
has often been advocated. These reforms would 
improve the welfare of euro area citizens and 
also, as a welcome side-effect, facilitate the 
conduct of monetary policy. Against this 
background, a particularly relevant question that 
can be posed is whether monetary policy should 
help implement structural reforms. The objective 
of this paper is to provide a review of the existing 
literature on structural reforms in Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and to discuss the 
possible ways in which monetary policy could 
support the structural reform process. In the 
context of EMU, the main conclusions that 
emerge are that the monetary policy for the euro 
area is not the appropriate tool for mitigating the 
potential and uncertain short-term costs of 
reforms or for providing incentives for structural 
reforms at the national level. However, credible 
monetary policy aimed at price stability can 
improve the functioning of the supply side of the 
economy and contribute to an environment 
which is conducive to welfare-enhancing 
structural changes. In addition, the ECB’s 
contribution to the implementation of structural 
reforms takes the form of analysis, assessment 
and communication. 5
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Since the inception of the euro area, the need 
for structural reforms has often been advocated. 
These reforms would increase flexibility and 
competition, thereby enhancing productivity, 
employment and the ability of the euro area 
economy to absorb domestic and external 
shocks. All this would improve the welfare of 
euro area citizens and also, as a welcome side-
effect, facilitate the conduct of monetary policy. 
Against this background, a particularly relevant 
question that can be posed is whether monetary 
policy should help implement structural 
reforms, as some observers have recently 
suggested (e.g. Gros et al., 2004), and if so, 
how. 
The objective of this paper is to provide a 
review of the existing literature on structural 
reforms in Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) and to discuss the possible ways in 
which monetary policy could support the 
structural reform process. While this paper 
mainly focuses on product and labour market 
reforms, it also refers, when appropriate, to the 
role of reforms in fostering the integration and 
the efficiency of the euro area financial 
markets.1 
The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows. Chapter 2 analyses the effects of 
structural reforms on output and inflation. 
Chapter 3 tackles the issue of why it is 
apparently so difficult to implement structural 
reforms, despite the broad consensus regarding 
their beneficial effects. In particular, this 
chapter reviews several explanations offered by 
the political economy literature, which analyses 
the influence of politically motivated 
governments on economic outcomes. Finally, 
taking into account the institutional framework
of the euro area, Chapter 4 investigates whether 
macroeconomic policy should support structural 
reforms. Finally, Chapter 5 suggests some 
possible policy conclusions.
1  For an extensive treatment of the current state of the euro area 
financial market integration process, likely future developments 
and the ECB’s involvement in this process, see ECB 
(2004a, 2004b).6
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2  THE RELEVANCE OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS
2.1  BENEFITS OF LABOUR AND PRODUCT 
MARKET REFORMS
LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND PRODUCT 
MARKET REGULATIONS
The functioning of labour and product markets 
is largely determined by the features of labour 
market institutions and product market 
regulations. Although these are difficult to 
define precisely, labour market institutions 
include trade unions, wage bargaining systems, 
taxes on labour, minimum wages, regulation on 
working conditions, employment protection 
legislation, unemployment benefit systems as 
well as active labour market policies. Product 
market regulations for their part include 
measures such as state control, regulatory and 
administrative opacity, government regulation 
on competition as well as barriers to trade and 
investment.2
These institutions and regulations affect the 
setting of wages and prices and may as a result 
have an impact on inflation and its dynamics. 
To the extent that they affect inter alia labour 
supply and demand via labour mobility, human 
capital accumulation, innovation as well as the 
rates at which low productivity companies are 
replaced by high productivity firms, these 
institutions may influence productivity, 
employment and output growth. In the same 
vein, to the extent that they have an impact on 
the search effectiveness of unemployed persons 
(e.g. via the level of benefits), on the strength 
of workers in the bargaining process or on the 
elasticity of product demand by firms, they may 
affect equilibrium unemployment and thus 
productivity and potential output growth in 
turn.3
Labour market institutions and product market 
regulations can give rise to so-called structural 
rigidities when they prevent firms and workers 
from flexibly reacting to changing supply and 
demand conditions. These structural rigidities 
may, for example, take the form of nominal and 
real wage rigidities, or price rigidities. 
Downward nominal wage rigidities, for 
example, may be due to labour market 
institutions such as minimum wages, reservation 
wages determined by the level of unemployment 
benefits or long contract durations. Real wage 
rigidities may arise in the presence of wage 
indexation clauses or under certain wage-
bargaining settings. Finally, price rigidities 
may appear for example in the form of “menu” 
and information costs impeding adjustments in 
product and consumer prices.
REMOVING STRUCTURAL RIGIDITIES
Structural reforms in product and labour 
markets are supposed to improve the functioning 
of markets by removing the structural rigidities 
associated with labour market institutions and 
product market regulations.4 In this regard, they 
particularly aim at facilitating firms’ and 
workers’ entry into product and labour markets 
in order to enhance employment by reducing 
the profit and wage rents that develop in the 
presence of oligopolistic market structures (see 
e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). In the same 
vein, a reduction in the level of unemployment 
benefits is supposed to enhance incentives to 
work, increasing the search activity of the 
unemployed and lowering workers’ reservation 
wage, thus reducing nominal and real wage 
rigidities and enhancing equilibrium 
employment.5 A reduction in the level of 
employment protection legislation may increase 
labour demand in particular by lowering 
employers’ hesitance to hire so-called marginal 
groups in the labour market (such as young 
school leavers without work experience or 
2  See OECD (2007) for an overview of structural indicators 
measuring progress with structural reforms in OECD 
countries.
3  For a survey of this issue, see Nickell and Layard (1999).
4  Often, this is tantamount to reducing the impact of governments 
on market behaviour. For a discussion of the concept of 
structural reform, see IMF (2004).
5  The potential ability of structural reforms to contribute to 
increasing employment and reducing unemployment basically 
formed the starting point of the OECD Jobs Study (1994), which 
triggered the discussion of how structural reform could address 
the problem of high and persistent unemployment in European 
countries. In its reassessment of the 1994 OECD Jobs Strategy, 
the OECD has shifted its focus more onto employment. For 
more details, see Brandt et al. (2005) and OECD (2006b).7
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2 THE RELEVANCE 
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REFORMS women after long career breaks), whose abilities 
are not directly observable by firms. 
As a consequence, in the medium to long run, 
and given the resulting changes in wage and 
price signals, in a first-best setting, labour and 
product market reforms should increase the 
mobility of production factors and improve 
their allocation in the economy towards their 
most efficient use. By creating new production 
and employment opportunities, this raises 
productivity and the economy’s aggregate 
output. However, during the adjustment process 
following the implementation of structural 
reforms, the input of labour relative to capital 
may rise when employment increases, resulting 
in lower labour productivity.6 In the long run, 
however, more competition and flexibility in 
labour and product markets should trigger 
innovations and reduce rents in profits and 
wages, raising an economy’s total factor 
productivity, employment and real incomes. 
Generally, different structural reforms affect 
potential output growth and prices through 
different channels and to a varying extent, as 
they also depend on the cross-market effects of 
labour market reforms on product market 
outcomes and vice versa, as well as on each 
country’s starting position in the reform 
process.7 Consequently, the impact of structural 
reforms generally needs to be evaluated on a 
case-by-case, country-by-country basis.
SELECTED EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A number of empirical studies have attempted 
to estimate the degree of downward wage 
rigidity in European countries. Their results 
suggest that fairly significant downward 
nominal wage rigidities do exist, although there 
is considerable variation across European 
countries.8 With regard to real wage rigidities, 
Dickens et al. (2006) find that these appear to 
be more common in European countries than in 
the US, and are associated with the degree of 
union presence, suggesting that participants in 
collective wage bargaining focus more on real 
than on nominal wage changes.9 To the extent 
that wages affect firms’ marginal costs, such 
wage rigidities affect the dynamics of inflation, 
with more rigid wages tending to lead to more 
persistent movements in inflation.10, 11
Against a background of high and rising levels 
of unemployment in Europe over the last few 
decades, many empirical studies have focused 
on identifying the impact of labour market 
institutions on unemployment and growth in 
European countries.12 These studies differ with 
respect to the institutions analysed and also, 
partly significantly, with respect to the results 
obtained on the role of institutions in explaining 
developments in unemployment. Several of 
these studies have pointed to high net 
replacement rates13 as being an important factor 
contributing to unemployment, in addition to 
the impact of unions. The impact of employment 
protection legislation and active labour market 
policies is, however, less clear.14
6  In turn, the input of capital may rise relative to labour when 
investment picks up, thus leading to lower capital productivity.
7  See OECD (2002) for the implications of cross-market effects 
created by structural reforms.
8  For a brief survey of the literature, see the “Wage rigidities in 
the euro area and the United States” Box in the January 2007 
ECB Monthly Bulletin article entitled “Changes in the structural 
features of euro area labour markets over the last decade”.
9  At the same time, Bewley (1999, 2006) finds that there is a clear 
reluctance to cut nominal wages for reasons  of fairness and 
morale.
10  For more details on models assessing inflation dynamics in the 
presence of wage rigidities, see Christoffel and Linzert (2005), 
Christoffel, Kuester and Linzert (2006), and Blanchard and Gali 
(2006).
11  Improving job mediation and raising the workforce’s educational 
attainment tends to reduce bottlenecks in the labour market and 
helps align wage developments with labour productivity growth, 
thus lowering potential inflationary pressures. For an analysis, 
see ECB (2002).
12 For a survey, see Nickell and Layard (1999), Bassanini and 
Duval (2006) and Blanchard (2006).
13 Net replacement rates are a measure of the net income that 
unemployed persons receive while out of work. See for example 
Nickell (1997), Elmeskov et al. (1998), Nickell and Layard 
(1999), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Nickell et al. 
(2005).
14  Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) show that the interaction of some 
labour market institutions with cyclical and structural shocks 
contributes to explaining the increase in European unemployment 
over time as well as the heterogeneity of unemployment 
developments across EU countries. Their results indicate that 
whereas cyclical and structural shocks contribute to the general 
increase in unemployment, the interaction of these changes with 
different national labour market institutions seems to explain 
some of the heterogeneity of unemployment trends.8
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2.2  BENEFITS OF FINANCIAL MARKET REFORMS
Financial market reforms designed to achieve 
greater efficiency, increased competition and 
further integration would also help increase the 
euro area’s long-term potential growth rate. 
To the extent that reforms lead to efficient 
and more “complete” financial markets, the 
possibility also increases that individual 
investors will finance projects and hedge 
investment risk, thereby contributing to higher 
potential output (see Hart, 1975). Moreover, by 
ensuring equal access to financial instruments 
and services, the process of financial integration 
will eliminate some of the barriers to trading, 
clearing and settlement platforms, therefore 
enhancing capital allocation towards the most 
productive investment opportunities.15
In addition, potential output growth may benefit 
from more efficient financial markets and 
higher levels of financial integration, as the 
latter should foster additional opportunities to 
share risk among investors, thus encouraging 
private saving flows into investment 
opportunities that present higher returns and 
that would not be undertaken if the risk could 
not be spread efficiently. In particular, Hartmann 
et al. (2007) argue that there remains significant 
scope for further growth in European financial 
securitisation, which would improve the 
allocation of risk as well as free bank capital 
for further lending to firms. Furthermore, as 
shown by Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha 
(2001), sharing risk across regions enhances 
specialisation in production, resulting in clear 
productivity increases. 
Greater financial integration and enhanced 
competition also encourages further financial 
sector development, which in turn leads to 
higher levels of economic growth. As noted 
by Gianetti et al. (2002), provided a proper 
framework for prudential regulation exists, 
financial integration should increase competition 
among the financial sectors of different 
countries or economic regions, thereby 
increasing their efficiency by reducing 
intermediation costs and attracting more capital 
from domestic and foreign investors. This leads 
financial intermediaries to specialise in the 
collection and dissemination of information 
so that the allocation of resources can be 
performed more efficiently and at a lower 
cost (see Levine, 1977). Rousseau (2002) finds 
empirical evidence that financial development 
promotes investment and business by 
reallocating capital, while industry-level studies 
like that of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show 
that financial development results in economic 
growth.16 Moreover, Bekaert et al. (2004) find 
that equity market liberalisation – defined as 
the right of foreign investors to trade in domestic 
securities and of domestic investors to trade 
in foreign securities – increases subsequent 
average annual real economic growth. 
Finally, financial market reforms also impact 
the way that firms react to changes in financial 
conditions. For example, financial market 
frictions make external finance more expensive 
owing to informational and agency problems, 
leading to the External Finance Premium (EFP) 
for external funds, especially for smaller firms. 
Frictions in financial markets therefore have 
firm-distributional effects, as finance becomes 
relatively more expensive for small firms than 
for large ones, which has further consequences 
for competition and hence output and 
employment. 
With regard to the euro area, the introduction of 
the single currency has enhanced the liquidity 
and the efficiency of the euro area financial 
markets, especially in the unsecured money 
market segment, which is now completely 
integrated.17 However, some scope remains for 
structural policies that could increase the 
efficiency of the euro area financial markets in 
15  See also Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2004, 2005). 
16  In the euro area, ECB (2006) finds that the limited development 
of the capital markets is one important factor hindering their 
efficiency. In particular, venture capital financing – which 
typically provides start-up financing for entrepreneurs to 
develop their ideas and encourages the emergence of new firms 
– is very low in many European countries compared to the US. 
Public ownership and participation in the banking sector also 
limits the growth and development of the financial sector. 
17 See  ECB  (2004a).9
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REFORMS three main ways.18 First, euro area-wide 
competition policies may be beneficial for 
further banking integration, even though some 
of the inherent characteristics of traditional 
loan and deposit business constrain the cross-
border expansion of commercial banking, even 
in a common currency area. Second, it would be 
desirable to promote open access to clearing 
and settlement systems, which remain highly 
fragmented in the euro area. Third, good 
corporate governance is required for the further 
development of the European single market 
because it contributes to fostering entrepreneurial 
activity.19
18  See ECB (2004a) and ECB (2006).
19  ECB (2006) points out that in the area of corporate governance, 
there are a number of open issues that deserve attention. 
Minority shareholders’ rights to enforce protection against self-
dealing by controlling shareholders or company directors should 
be strengthened. In addition, firms’ concentration should decline 
and the role of institutional investors should be enhanced, as 
should the efficiency of legal systems in solving financial 
conflicts in certain European countries.10
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3  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRUCTURAL 
REFORMS IN THE EURO AREA: WHY IS 
PROGRESS SO UNSATISFACTORY? 
Despite broad consensus on the necessity of 
structural reforms in euro area product and 
labour markets, overall progress with the 
implementation of reforms has so far been 
insufficient. This is revealed, for example, by 
low productivity growth in the euro area 
compared to the US. Moreover, although the 
unemployment rate in the euro area declined by 
2.6 percentage points between 1995 and 2006, 
it is still far too high, with a level standing 
at 7.9% in 2006. In a similar fashion, the share 
of long-term unemployed in total euro area 
unemployment, which is often used as an 
indicator of underlying labour market rigidities, 
also remains extremely high at 46.8% in 2006, 
even though it declined by 2.7 percentage points 
between 1995 and 2006.20 At the same time, 
estimates of the non-accelerating inflation rate 
of unemployment (NAIRU), although having 
declined in recent years, still point to a high 
level of structural unemployment in the euro 
area.21
Against this background, continuation and 
speeding up of the reform progress is crucial if 
labour market conditions are to improve. 
However, resistance to reforms is particularly 
evident regarding labour market reforms, even 
if in a survey of EU citizens conducted by the 
European Commission in 2001, 90% said that 
fighting unemployment should be a priority 
policy action.22
Looking at the experience of other countries, it 
appears that significant structural reforms are 
often triggered by economic crises (the “back 
against the wall” hypothesis). Economic crises 
can promote reforms because bad economic 
conditions make it more obvious that the 
policies in place are no longer sustainable. In 
addition, crises introduce a sense of urgency in 
the decision-making process, tend to weaken 
opposition to reforms, and raise the cost of 
non-action.23 Two examples of implementing 
reforms as a consequence of crises are the US 
towards the end of the 1970s and the UK at the 
beginning of the 1980s. Between the late 1960s 
and the early 1980s, the US drifted into periods 
of high and volatile inflation with elevated and 
erratic interest rate levels, a declining dollar 
relative to most major currencies, as well as a 
gradual rise in unemployment. This situation 
gave rise to far-reaching policy changes. 
Monetary policy was reoriented, by an 
amendment to the Federal Reserve Act in 1977, 
towards a dual mandate that explicitly 
incorporated price stability, implying less 
emphasis on attempts to fine-tune the real 
economy. This monetary policy regime change, 
which was put in place from 1979 onwards by 
Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, was accompanied 
by the rigorous implementation of policies that 
aimed at improving the functioning of the 
supply side.24 Turning to the UK, the recession 
after the first oil price shock in 1973, coupled 
with high inflation and a balance of payments 
crisis in 1976, led to a comprehensive 
programme of structural reforms following a 
period of economic decline vis-à-vis other 
industrialised countries. 
The most recent literature identifies several 
explanations for the sluggish implementation 
of structural reforms and analyses how they 
could be overcome by gaining political support 
for structural changes; these are analysed in 
detail in sub-section 3.1 below.25 
20  The term “long-term unemployed” is defined as persons who 
have been unemployed for more than 12 months. 
21 For a discussion of this issue, see European Commission 
(2006).
22  See European Commission (2001). In May 2007, unemployment 
still topped the list of issues European citizens are most 
concerned about. In the presence of improving labour market 
conditions, it was, mentioned by 34%, see European Commission 
(2007) 
23  See for example Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi (2006) and Hoj et 
al. (2006).
24  These policies included reductions in the marginal income tax 
rates and unemployment benefits, as well as the opening up of 
network industries such as telecommunication services, railways 
and surface mail.
25  See for example Lora et al. (2004) and Hoj et al. (2006).11
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REFORMS IN THE 
EURO AREA: WHY 
IS PROGRESS SO 
UNSATISFACTORY? 
3.1  SOME ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS FOR THE 
OPPOSITION TO REFORMS
UNCERTAINTY ON THE OUTCOME OF THE REFORM 
PROCESS
The sluggish progress made to date with the 
implementation of structural reforms in the EU 
can partially be attributed to the uncertainty 
regarding the outcome of reforms. In this 
respect, two considerations are worth 
mentioning.
First, public awareness of the precise benefits 
that structural reforms could bring may be 
crucial in building support for such reforms. 
For example, in a 2004 survey of German 
citizens, 75% said that politicians had not 
sufficiently explained why the agreed reforms 
were necessary. Public resistance to reforms 
whose outcome is uncertain is thus hardly 
surprising.26 These findings are mirrored in a 
questionnaire-based survey for Germany and 
Italy conducted by Boeri et al. (2002), who find 
that the perception of a pension crisis is lower 
among those who are poorly informed about 
how the pension system works, making them 
less likely to support reform measures. 
Second, even if the public is well informed 
about the general benefits for the economy of a 
particular reform, i.e. even if the average payoff 
from the reform will be positive, resistance to 
reforms may also arise as the more uncertain 
individuals’ personal status is after the reform, 
the stronger they may support a specific 
unchanged outcome (the “no reform” scenario). 
Reformers must therefore counteract this 
“status quo bias”27, a task that may require 
compensating some social groups opposed to 
the reform.28
STRUCTURAL REFORMS CAN CREATE COSTS IN A 
SECOND-BEST WORLD
Another obstacle that structural reforms face 
from an economic point of view comes from the 
theory of second best (Rodrik, 2004): when an 
economy exhibits several inefficiencies, fixing 
only a few of them is no guarantee of improved 
economic performance, and may actually 
reduce welfare. For example, if some institutions 
were put in place to mitigate the negative effects 
of inefficient existing institutions, welfare may 
decrease if only the former are eliminated or 
making the use of temporary contracts more 
flexible without improving the flexibility of 
permanent contracts may lower productivity. 
By reducing the probability that temporary 
employees could become permanent, both their 
incentive to build up human capital and firms’ 
incentive to provide training are lowered, 
reducing productivity as a result (see Blanchard 
and Landier, 2002; OECD, 2006).29
MARKET FAILURES
Another potential reason why structural reforms 
may face opposition emphasises the difficulty 
of reforming institutions that were originally 
introduced with the aim of playing an important 
social role in mitigating market failures. For 
example, Pages (2004) argues that institutions 
such as public unemployment insurance may be 
justified if there are sizeable search costs in the 
labour market and, at the same time, insurance 
companies do not offer private unemployment 
insurance to employees owing to adverse 
26  Survey conducted by infratest dimap (“Deutschland-trend”) for 
ARD television, 2 July 2004.
27  See for example Samuelson and Zechkauser (1988), Fernandez 
and Rodrik (1991) and Saint-Paul (1996). In this respect, 
Heinemann (2004) suggests that loss aversion might explain 
why losers’ resistance to reform is potentially more intense than 
winners’ support.
28 See Rodrik (1994). In a dynamic environment, though, the 
government faces a trade-off when deciding on whether the 
losers of the reform should be compensated: on the one hand, 
such compensation would tend to increase support for the 
reform, yet on the other, it might trigger more opposition to 
future reforms as interest groups would fight for further 
compensatory measures. In practice, a case-by-case approach is 
the most likely outcome. For instance, if a pay-as-you-go 
pension scheme is partially replaced by a privately funded 
scheme, some compensation for those retirees that have 
contributed during their working lives to “buy the right” to 
receive a pension from the government is expected to receive 
widespread support.   
29  As temporary contracts are likely to be used by young workers, 
incentives to increase human capital are trimmed down for 
those who need them most (Alonso-Borrego and Aguirregabiria, 
1999). On the other hand, temporary workers may have more 
incentives to perform well as they enjoy less employment 
protection. Additionally, if they credibly perceive that their 
contracts may be renewed in case they perform well, they may 
still have incentives to invest in human capital in the short run 
to improve their performance.    12
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selection and moral hazard problems.30 
Similarly, government intervention may be 
needed to guarantee an effective minimum level 
of healthcare. As a consequence, reforms 
affecting the size of these institutions are 
impeded by the fact that there seems to be great 
demand for them (in particular for those related 
to social protection), reflecting social 
preferences (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2001).31 
Obviously, the less obvious the cost associated 
with these institutions is to the majority of 
voters, the higher the demand and the greater 
the resistance to reforms. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRUCTURAL 
REFORMS 
A further explanation for the difficulties 
encountered when conducting structural reforms 
can be found in the political economy literature: 
as structural reforms may have significant 
redistributive effects, the segments of the 
population that stand to lose from the reform, 
despite being in the minority compared with 
those who are expected to gain from the reform, 
could drive policy decisions in their favour if 
they are better organised, have greater political 
voice, and are better at lobbying for their own 
interests.32 The more successfully the group of 
those unwilling to reform is represented by 
interest groups and the more complex the link 
between the reform and the benefits for the 
majority, the more difficult the implementation 
of reforms becomes.33 In this context, Carcillo 
et al. (2004) and IMF (2004) have pointed out 
that small interest groups tend to have more 
power in proportional voting systems, rendering 
the rigorous implementation of structural 
reforms more difficult than in majoritarian 
voting systems. 
Furthermore, the political orientation of the 
government may affect the kind and magnitude 
of reforms implemented, with some governments 
putting more emphasis on equity than on 
efficiency when confronted with the equity-
efficiency trade-off. This may be tantamount to 
being more hesitant with labour market reforms 
than with product market reforms, where the 
involved interest groups are more evenly spread 
across the electorate of several parties 
(Castanheira et al., 2006).
Political economy considerations also play a 
prominent role in explaining resistance to the 
implementation of reforms when their costs and 
benefits are possibly distributed unevenly 
across time: even well-designed structural 
reform packages that unambiguously provide 
long-term social gains which outweigh any 
possible short-term costs are sometimes not 
implemented because politicians discount the 
future at a higher rate than is socially desirable, 
owing to the political uncertainty surrounding 
their eventual re-election (Bean, 1998).34 
Incumbent governments may fear losing 
political support today to achieve benefits that 
may only materialise over a time horizon 
beyond the election cycle, and eventually 
accrue to another government. Generally, these 
problems are exacerbated in ageing societies, 
as older people, especially if they have no 
children and thus no direct link to future 
30  See also Messina and Vallanti (2006), whose empirical findings 
suggest that employment protection legislation has contributed 
to stabilising employment fluctuations in Europe, providing 
workers with an insurance mechanism against the risk of losing 
their labour income.  
31  It can be argued that these social preferences may be biased, as 
the benefits of these institutions for certain groups are directly 
visible, whereas the costs created for the whole of society (e.g. 
in the form of distorted incentives, higher unemployment and 
lower real wages) could be much more indirect and, as a result, 
may be underestimated by the general public. While this 
argument may be true for certain institutions, it is less applicable 
to some of the examples described in the text, to the extent that 
in a context of severe market failures, economic distortions are 
clearly outweighed by the benefits from preserving human life 
more efficiently.    
32  See for example Heinemann (2004). Boeri et al. (2002) show 
that younger, more educated and richer males tend to support 
private pension systems, while union members, residents of 
poorer regions and those with a left-wing orientation strongly 
support the publicly funded “pay-as-you-go” system.
33 The recent demonstrations in France against the “first 
employment contract” illustrate this point: the reform was 
likely to increase employment prospects for uneducated youth, 
whose unemployment rate is high. However, the reform could 
also reduce the level of future expected employment protection 
for educated youth (university students) with respect to the 
status quo. Since university students are much better organised 
than uneducated youths, the reform encountered severe popular 
opposition and was finally abandoned.     
34  Begg (2000), Tabellini and Wyplosz (2004) and Chriszt and Kay 
(2004), among others, argue that most of the benefits from 
structural reforms usually take rather a long time to 
materialise.13
ECB 





REFORMS IN THE 
EURO AREA: WHY 
IS PROGRESS SO 
UNSATISFACTORY? 
generations, tend to discount the longer-term 
economic benefits of structural reforms more 
strongly than young persons.35
The economic literature has identified several 
reasons why structural reforms in labour 
markets may lead to a temporary decline in 
aggregate demand and/or to costs that may 
materialise before the long-term benefits 
described in Chapter 2:
–  Reductions in unemployment benefits would 
be likely to create short-term costs for the 
unemployed in the form of lower income 
support, while the positive effects on 
employment may take time to materialise.
–  Lower firing costs intensify labour-market 
turnover and employment rates do not 
necessarily rise (or unemployment rates 
drop) in the short run due to the effect of 
further layoffs (Blanchard and Landier, 
2002; Saint-Paul, 2002; Galiani and 
Hopenhayn, 2004).36 A higher probability 
of being fired spurs workers to reduce 
consumption in the short run in order to 
increase their precautionary savings. 
–  The introduction of fixed-term contracts for 
some employees, without making permanent 
contracts more flexible, may increase the 
bargaining power of permanent employees 
because it creates a cushion of temporary 
employees that will presumably be first to 
be laid off if the firm has to confront 
unfavourable economic circumstances. 
Their strengthened bargaining position 
might result in higher wages for permanent 
employees and lower employment rates 
relative to the no-reform scenario (Bentolila 
and Dolado, 1994).
Reforming the product market may also result 
in significant short-term costs: greater 
competition may occasionally have perverse 
outcomes on efficiency by diminishing the 
resources available to previously more protected 
firms for financing innovations (Aghion et al., 
2002; Etro, 2004). Additionally, Carcillo et al. 
(2004) suggest that the combination of 
dangerous over-employment, wage rigidities 
and inelastic demand may imply that sectoral 
employment has to decrease if labour 
productivity increases in the aftermath of 
liberalisation. Moreover, sectoral employment 
losses are not always absorbed straightforwardly 
by other sectors. If labour is at least partially 
sector-specific and real wages are not flexible, 
then some aggregate employment losses might 
emerge in the short term. 
Regarding the short-term costs associated with 
financial market reforms, it is not obvious that 
all countries will gain when a number of 
countries with structurally diverse financial 
systems open up to financial trade (ECB, 
2004a). Financial integration possibly creates 
winners and losers, and better capital allocation 
is expected to benefit many but could also hurt 
others in the short run.37 
Although it cannot be generalised, it seems that 
the positive impact of some reforms, such as 
falling relative prices following deregulation in 
telecommunication services or the beneficial 
effects of some tax reforms, tend to become 
obvious with less delay than others, e.g. the 
intended employment effects of many labour 
market reforms. IMF (2004) provides 
preliminary and tentative evidence of how 
consideration of the short-term costs implied 
by structural reforms has resulted in countries 
finding it easier to pursue financial market 
and trade reforms than product and labour 
market reforms, as the former normally yield 
35  Ageing societies might even fall into a demographic trap if the 
median voter becomes old enough to support relatively high 
taxes on the current active generation in order to finance 
relatively generous pension and healthcare systems. Such a trap, 
for the same reasons that give rise to the Laffer curve, implies 
that the economy would shift to a low-growth, high-tax steady 
state (Alesina and Angeletos, 2004), which might lead to a 
higher risk of government default if public expenditures, 
especially old-age benefits, are not cut.    
36  Such a short-term outcome may be more likely if there is a 
strong probability that the reform will be revised (e.g. following 
the next election).
37  The perceived potential disadvantages of free capital flows, in 
terms of a higher likelihood of financial crises, has led to 
suggestions for a tax on cross-border capital flows, even 
between developed countries/areas (Eichengreen et al., 1995). 14
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more immediate benefits with much less 
uncertainty.38
3.2  DOES EMU AFFECT THE INCENTIVES FOR 
PRODUCT AND LABOUR MARKET REFORMS?
In the particular case of EMU, some authors 
have argued that politicians in euro area 
countries have already spent their limited 
amount of political capital during the 
convergence process on policies aimed at 
lowering inflation and fiscal consolidation. 
Against this background, these same politicians 
or parties may struggle to convince their 
constituencies that further investment is needed 
in the form of labour and product market 
reforms, in order to foster long-term potential 
growth and a sustainable employment rate. 
However, this theoretical argument runs counter 
to Bertola and Boeri (2002), who find that the 
adoption of the euro has triggered an acceleration 
in the pace of labour market reforms in those 
countries that joined the euro area. Although 
the euro area countries started out with a higher 
level of labour market inflexibility, as measured 
by employment protection legislation and 
benefits for the unemployed, euro area countries 
implemented more reforms between 1997 and 
2002 than between 1986 and 1996 compared to 
non-euro area countries. Even though the raw 
number of reforms is of course an unsatisfactory 
measure of reform efforts and provides only 
partial information on the impact and success 
of such reforms, there is nevertheless wide 
agreement that such reforms have contributed 
to the employment gains observed in the euro 
area over the last few years.39
Duval and Elmeskov (2005) discuss more 
generally factors that increase or reduce the 
incentives to implement structural reforms 
within EMU. In their discussion, they highlight 
other determinants that the game-theoretic 
approach is unable to consider fully. For 
instance, they argue that a common fiscal policy 
regime in EMU would increase Member States’ 
incentives to implement structural reforms, as 
national governments may not be able to 
compensate the effects of a negative local shock 
purely by using domestic fiscal policy alone. 
They also highlight how greater price 
transparency across countries may reduce the 
monopoly rents created by structural rigidities, 
thus reducing the incentive to resist those 
reforms that would eliminate such rigidities. 
On the other hand, they argue that the literature 
analysing the incentive structure of countries 
participating in a monetary union (MU) from a 
game-theoretic point of view concludes that 
participation in an MU may also lower countries’ 
incentives to implement structural reforms for 
two main reasons. First, from a more long-term 
perspective, structural reforms would benefit 
countries running independent monetary 
policies, because the elimination of structural 
rigidities would reduce the inflation bias40 of 
the monetary authority. In an MU, structural 
reforms in a single country would not eliminate 
the “area-wide” inflation bias, thus providing 
ex ante fewer incentives for structural reforms. 
Second, countries may refuse to embark on 
reforms that could have short-term costs, either 
because of governments’ short-sightedness or 
because monetary policy can only partially 
38 International influences may foster the implementation of 
structural reforms. For example, a high degree of openness to 
trade and a high level of foreign direct investment may raise 
incentives for domestic firms to call for labour and product 
market reforms that would reduce their production costs, thus 
increasing their competitiveness (see e.g. Blanchard and 
Giavazzi, 2003). Furthermore, product market reforms may be 
fostered by supranational constraints imposed by international 
agreements or treaties, e.g. within the EU and the World Trade 
Organization. Hoj et al. (2006) find empirical support that the 
“international co-operative approach to liberalisation” such as 
the EU Internal Market Programme has been successful in 
pushing forward with product market reform. However, the 
reduction of tariff barriers is found by contrast to be associated 
with “a less liberal stance in labour markets”. 
39  See also ECB (2007).
40  In the game-theoretic literature of monetary policy, an inflation 
bias arises if the central bank weighs positively in its loss 
function the deviations of actual output from the level of output 
that could be attained if there were no real frictions in the 
economy. More precisely, the central bank may be aware that 
structural rigidities would constrain the “equilibrium” output 
level to be lower than the level which is compatible with full 
employment. Hence, this monetary authority tries to produce 
the amount of inflation that is necessary to close the gap 
between potential and “full employment” output. Obviously, in 
this case in the long run, the level of output and employment 
will still be at the suboptimal, rigid potential level, but the 
economy would suffer from a higher than necessary inflation 
rate.15
ECB 





REFORMS IN THE 
EURO AREA: WHY 
IS PROGRESS SO 
UNSATISFACTORY? 
compensate for the short-term decline in 
regional domestic demand.41
The rest of this chapter analyses in more depth 
the conclusions reached by the game-theoretic 
literature, which takes into account the strategic 
interactions between private economic agents 
and policymakers for the determination of 
economic outcomes.42, 43
This literature extends the framework designed 
in Barro and Gordon (1983) to the case of an 
MU among different sovereign countries where 
monetary policy is centralised, but fiscal and 
structural policies remain in the domain of the 
national authorities. In general, monetary policy 
in this type of model only affects real output in 
the short term, as a consequence of “surprise” 
inflation produced by the central bank. Higher 
than expected inflation reduces real wages, and 
firms are willing to hire more workers and 
produce more products than they would in 
equilibrium. In the long run, real wages reverse 
their fall as nominal wages catch up with higher 
actual inflation and output reverts to equilibrium. 
Inflation will be permanently higher. This set-
up allows an investigation into the conditions 
under which EMU would strengthen or weaken 
the incentives for national governments to 
implement labour market reforms that would 
increase long-term potential output growth and 
lower the persistence of output and inflation 
deviations from their equilibrium values in 
countries participating in EMU.44
One important contribution to this literature 
is that of Calmfors (2001), whose model is 
explained and discussed in detail in Annex 1. 
The most relevant results obtained in the paper 
are the following:
–  Result 1: When only the effects of structural 
reforms on equilibrium unemployment and 
inflation are considered, the existence of an 
“inflation bias”, both at the national and the 
MU aggregate level, delivers more incentives 
to reform outside an MU than inside it. 
Hence, in this model, an MU with 
decentralised economic policies will only 
deliver a suboptimal level of structural 
reforms. However, if there is no national 
inflation bias, the incentives to reform 
inside and outside the MU are the same, and 
the actual level of reforms implemented 
depends on the structural parameters of the 
model.45 Quite differently, in case of 
participation in an MU, if the single MU 
central bank has an inflation bias, it will try 
to reduce countries’ average deviations of 
actual output from “MU-wide frictionless” 
output in order to reduce average 
unemployment in the MU (i.e. it suffers 
from an area-wide inflation bias). Hence, 
from the country point of view, the amount 
of inflation created by the single central 
bank is lower than the amount of inflation a 
domestic central bank would have created 
to reduce unemployment. Hence, the 
41  Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2001) and Saint-Paul (2002) argue 
that countries participating in EMU have lower incentives to 
implement structural reforms that would lead to the above-
mentioned short-term macroeconomic costs than countries that 
retain their national competence regarding monetary policy. 
Furthermore, they highlight another limitation to structural 
reforms under EMU: their potentially deflationary impact. They 
argue that if (i) a national government tries to avoid national 
deflation because, among other reasons, deflation reduces the 
tax receipts of the government under a non-indexed national tax 
system, and (ii) if the reform does not sufficiently broaden the 
tax base in the short run to compensate for the above-mentioned 
decrease in nominal tax receipts, then the maximum size of any 
reform will be smaller (i) the lower the common trend of 
inflation in the MU, and (ii) the stronger the downward impact 
of the reform on national inflation.
42  See Ozkan et al. (1997), Siebert (1999), Siebert and Sutherland 
(2000) and Calmfors (2001).
43  One further argument supporting the favourable impact of EMU 
on the incentives for national governments to implement 
structural reforms which has not yet been tackled in the 
economic literature is the increased policy competition induced 
by the more transparent economic environment. Within an MU, 
voters may increasingly compare economic outcomes and best 
practices across euro area governments, thereby putting pressure 
on poorly performing governments.
44 This is because in the model the higher the equilibrium 
unemployment and expected inflation, the higher the level of 
structural reforms. In case of non-participation in the MU, the 
national central bank’s inflation bias will increase the 
government expected inflation without reducing the government 
expected unemployment. In addition, this literature also 
provides normative prescriptions for the general macroeconomic 
policy stance given structural reforms as well as for the need for 
national policymakers to coordinate in order to achieve the 
optimal level of structural reform.
45 This is because the government knows that the monetary 
impulse will be short-lived and its impact on unemployment 
will evaporate in the long run.16
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incentives to implement structural reforms 
are lower.46
–  Result 2:  When the effects of structural 
reforms on both equilibrium unemployment 
and inflation as well as on nominal wage 
flexibility are considered, in the presence of 
a national inflation bias it is not clear 
whether incentives to reform are higher 
inside or outside the MU. However, in the 
absence of a national inflation bias, the 
analysis unambiguously reveals that national 
governments have greater incentives to 
implement structural reforms inside the MU 
than outside. This differs from the scenario 
when structural reforms only affect 
equilibrium variables: in this case, in an 
MU the government has an incentive to 
implement more structural reforms in order 
to increase the flexibility of its economy, 
thus enabling it to better absorb those shocks 
that in autarky were more efficiently taken 
into account by the domestic central bank. 
Intuitively, the incentives to produce 
structural reforms are higher in an MU, 
precisely because the government wants to 
increase the flexibility of the domestic 
economy in order to compensate for the lack 
of a central bank response to idiosyncratic 
national shocks.47
These results are robust to a number of 
extensions. Calmfors (2001) confirms that the 
MU will unambiguously deliver more structural 
reforms than non-participation in an MU, when 
the national governments and monetary 
authorities have loss functions such that there 
is a positive relationship between the utility 
costs of variations in unemployment and 
inflation on one side, and the average 
equilibrium unemployment and inflation around 
which these variations occur on the other side.48 
This positive relationship provides governments 
with a “precautionary” rational motive for 
labour market reforms, much in the same way 
that income uncertainty may give rise to 
precautionary savings. 
Finally, in the same vein as Calmfors (2001), 
Siebert and Sutherland (2000)49 show that small 
countries joining an MU have more incentives 
than larger countries to implement structural 
reforms that increase nominal wage flexibility, 
as the shocks hitting their economies are less 
correlated with the average shocks for the area, 
and their weight in the MU is low. In this 
situation, the smaller the country, the less it can 
expect a centralised monetary policy to be able 
to stabilise the idiosyncratic shocks hitting its 
own economy. Thus, according to this argument, 
the smaller the country (or, equivalently, the 
more numerous the countries joining the MU), 
the higher the incentives for national 
governments to implement structural reforms 
that help their respective domestic economies 
to absorb non-area-wide shocks.
46  Equations (6) and (9) in Annex 1 show that, minus the inflation 
bias, the optimal level of structural reforms does not depend on 
monetary policy (the second terms in both equations disappear) 
and thus would not be affected by the country joining an MU or 
deciding not to join.
47  For the euro area, it can be safely assumed that neither national 
authorities nor the ECB suffer from an inflation bias. National 
governments should have more incentives to implement 
structural reforms than they would if monetary policy were in 
the hands of a domestic authority. 
48  In this scenario, the marginal disutility of both unemployment 
and inflation is convex, and no longer linear as in the case of a 
standard, quadratic loss function.
49 In their multi-country model, Siebert and Sutherland (2000) 
analyse the implications of possible spillover effects of 
decentralised national monetary policy stabilisation on other 
countries. These spillovers reflect inflation differentials among 
countries – weighted by the size of each country relative to the 
size of the aggregate area – whereby higher inflation in one 
country is assumed to be related to higher production costs 
(higher wages) and, consequently, to lead to shifts in production 
to other lower inflation countries. Once again, if governments 
have an inflation bias, as in Calmfors’ (2001) model, the 
incentives to implement structural reforms are lower in an MU 
because the loss arising from the inflation bias is lower than it 
would be in the case of no participation in the MU. This is for 
two reasons: first, in an MU the inflation bias is lower because 
national policymakers internalise the losses arising from having 
higher inflation than their trading partners. In comparison with 
the Calmfors (2001) model, in the Siebert and Sutherland (2000) 
model the central bank recognises that the gains from inflation 
are reduced by the loss of competitiveness, as in an MU the 
nominal exchange rate cannot compensate for the inflation 
differential. Second, as in Calmfors (2001) – see Result 1 above 
– in an MU, monetary policy is centralised and based on area-
average variables. This implies that national policymakers with 
an inflation bias have lower incentives to implement structural 
reforms that would have a limited impact on the average 
deviation of equilibrium output from its non-distortionary 
level. 17
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Following on from the above discussion, the 
current status of efforts aimed at implementing 
structural reforms in the euro area can be 
characterised as follows: broad consensus has 
been reached on the necessity of structural 
reforms in the euro area, and EMU participation 
does not per se mitigate the incentives for 
national policymakers to implement such 
structural reforms. However, although 
significant progress has been made with 
structural reforms in recent years, politically 
motivated governments tend not to implement 
sufficient structural reforms because they are 
afraid of losing voters’ support (and future 
elections) if they were to introduce reforms 
whose negative, short-term effects would be 
relatively more visible to voters, and whose 
positive, long-term effects could be more 
difficult to ascertain in advance. 
Carcillo et al. (2004) suggest that a unique 
solution capable of unlocking the reform 
process in the EU might not exist, as each EU 
Member State has its own specific institutions 
and reform needs. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, structural reforms are more likely to be 
advocated in emergency situations (e.g. in the 
midst of a crisis), when the short-term political 
costs of inaction may be even higher than those 
stemming from the implementation of the 
reform package (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; 
Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Rodrik, 1994).50
However, as some authors have argued, 
countries do not have to plunge into costly 
economic and financial crises in order to decide 
to implement structural reform packages. While 
reform packages indeed entail short-term costs, 
appropriate macroeconomic policies could 
mitigate this impact, thus relieving governments 
from worries connected to the political cycle. 
Blanchard et al. (1986), describing what has 
since been termed the “two-handed approach”51 
to structural reforms, argue that some 
macroeconomic stimulus from aggregate 
demand policies might be necessary to foster 
the implementation of structural reform 
packages. Given that, as discussed above, 
structural reforms are critical for long-term 
output and employment growth, but will 
presumably only contribute gradually to these 
goals,  “something much more immediate is 
needed to change the course of events” in the 
short run. 
These authors advocate that structural reforms 
must be accompanied with a set of timely 
supply incentives which, together with 
expansionary demand policies, would start 
improving employment in the short term and 
make it much easier to find the social agreement 
required to proceed with some difficult reform 
proposals. However, according to Tabellini and 
Wyplosz (2004), the timing of the two-handed 
approach is crucial. In their view, expansionary 
aggregate demand policies should not be put in 
place until the reform package is implemented, 
as otherwise they may foster the illusion that 
reforms are not so urgent. 
The macroeconomic thrust of the “two-handed 
approach” is as follows52: structural reforms in 
the labour market may lead to an immediate fall 
in the natural rate of unemployment, i.e. the 
rate to which the unemployment rate converges 
in the absence of shocks. However, the actual 
unemployment rate does not immediately 
follow the adjustment in the natural rate. This 
scenario, in which the unemployment rate lies 
above the natural rate, is one which does not 
fully utilise economic resources, and could lead 
to decreasing prices. Therefore, even if 
employment increases after the reform, output 
might for some time remain below potential. 
This makes it desirable to exert some stimulus 
through monetary and/or fiscal policies. 
Furthermore, the possible deflationary impact 
of a structural reform may be even larger if 
employment protection is curtailed, since 
(i) the aforementioned effects are aggravated 
50  See Saint-Paul (2002) for a different view. 
51  See also Bean (1998) and Blanchard (2006).
52 See Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2001), Saint-Paul (2002) and 
Gros et al. (2004).18
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by the wealth effects of unproductive jobs being 
destroyed after the reform; and (ii) the creation 
of new productive jobs will presumably take 
some time to materialise owing to adjustment 
costs, which implies that borrowing constraints 
and uncertainty are likely to prevent those who 
presumably will be employed in the future from 
increasing current consumption.
4.1 THE  TWO-HANDED  APPROACH  AND  EMU
By centralising monetary policy and establishing 
clear constraints on national fiscal policies, the 
creation of EMU has profoundly changed the 
macroeconomic environment of participating 
countries. These changes are moreover highly 
relevant in shaping the possible implementation 
of “two-handed” policies in the euro area. 
In particular, before EMU, national governments 
had full control of their own fiscal policies and 
could therefore use transitory fiscal deficits to 
mitigate the negative short-term effects of some 
structural reforms. Furthermore, national 
central banks, at least in principle, could 
counteract the short-run negative output gap 
generated by the implementation of some 
structural reforms, thereby supporting the 
national government in question. 
After EMU, however, national authorities 
within the euro area no longer control their own 
monetary policy and are thus unable to support 
structural reform programmes by ensuring the 
best feasible transition path to the new natural 
rate of unemployment. Within EMU, a single 
country embarking on possibly painful structural 
reforms would face a single monetary authority, 
the ECB, which has to assess its policy stance 
against economic developments in the euro area 
as a whole. Especially in the case of the smaller 
euro area countries, the “unemployment gap” 
created by some structural reforms would then 
not be compensated by an easier monetary 
policy stance unless the aggregate euro area 
economic developments point to a “euro area-
wide” unemployment gap (for a discussion of 
this issue, see Hoj et al., 2006).53
Against this background, it may be argued that 
fiscal policy – which in EMU remains under 
the domain of the national governments’ 
competences – is the tool that may provide the 
necessary support for structural reform packages 
by compensating the deflationary short-term 
impact of such packages.54
However, as some authors55 have argued, this 
avenue seems to be severely curtailed by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to which 
individual countries are committed. In this 
sense, Beetsma and Debrun (2003) find that the 
constraint on fiscal deficits imposed by the SGP 
may impair structural reforms to some extent, 
as national governments are tempted to sacrifice 
future growth for present stability. Furthermore, 
this literature claims that many key reforms 
advocated by some international organisations 
may, independently from providing ex post 
support to domestic demand, require substantial 
upfront fiscal costs and could thereby clash 
with the requirements of the SGP for countries 
53  The size of the unemployment gap that may appear in those 
countries that conduct structural reforms is likely to decrease 
with the degree of integration of labour, product and financial 
markets in the currency area: in a flexible economy, lower 
prices following a structural reform in any country of the 
currency area would increase the competitiveness of the goods 
and services produced in that economy, raising incentives to 
invest and therefore compensating potential contractionary 
effects. Those reforms that help to enhance the adjustment 
mechanisms within the currency area are thus particularly 
important, as they may contribute to dampening the size and 
persistence of national output and unemployment gaps.  
54  The effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy for fine-tuning 
macroeconomic fluctuations has, however, long been a subject 
of debate, with critics pointing to the long implementation lags 
and problems of time-inconsistency in particular (see Friedman, 
1953, and Fischer, 1980). For more recent contributions, see 
Taylor (2000) and Auerbach (2002). For a more favourable view 
of discretionary fiscal policies, see Blinder (2004).
55  See Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998), Bentolila and Saint-Paul 
(2001) and Saint-Paul (2002).19
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which are already close to the deficit limits.56, 57 
For instance, investment in public infrastructure 
is likely to require significant start-up costs, 
and the political appetite for crucial structural 
reforms may require some form of compensatory 
schemes aimed at smoothing the possibly 
harmful reorganisation of production processes 
and the loss of income in the short term by 
individuals who might lose their job or their 
benefits.58
Based on such considerations, some authors 
have suggested that the SGP should be 
reformulated to take into account the fact that 
the introduction of a ceiling on fiscal deficits 
has both a positive and a negative welfare 
effect, with lower public expenditure on the one 
hand to some extent compensated by less 
structural reforms on the other.59 Therefore, 
they propose that the Maastricht criteria ought 
to be relaxed when national governments pursue 
structural reforms with a negative short-term 
impact on the fiscal budget, because the optimal 
policy response to potential trade-offs between 
structural reforms and fiscal stabilisation does 
not necessarily imply that the stabilisation of 
the fiscal budget should come first in all 
circumstances. In particular, some authors have 
argued that constraints on fiscal behaviour are 
more likely to be welfare-enhancing when 
sanctions are made contingent on the level of 
reforms, as this would facilitate achieving a 
more favourable balance between the goals of 
stability and growth as proclaimed by the 
SGP. 
In this context, the recent reform of the SGP 
partially addresses these concerns in three 
main ways.60 First, the revised Pact allows 
for country-specific medium-term budgetary 
objectives that take into account public 
investment needs. Second, the implementation 
of structural reforms that have direct long-term 
cost-saving effects can be taken into account, 
allowing Member States to deviate either from 
their medium-term budgetary objectives or 
from the adjustment path towards them. And 
third, the implementation of the Lisbon Agenda 
is one of the relevant factors that may be taken 
into account when deciding whether a fiscal 
deficit that temporarily exceeds – but remains 
close to – 3% of GDP is excessive. 
Nevertheless, it should be made clear that there 
are reasons to be sceptical about the 
implementation of a deficit cap contingent on 
the structural reforms initiated by national 
governments. Measures of the effects of 
structural reforms are typically not available in 
real time, and national governments may 
therefore have incentives to overestimate the 
costs of the reforms they are pursuing as a 
56 See Daveri and Tabellini (2000) for a quantification of the 
effects of some structural reforms on the average budget gap 
in the EU. Generally, the sooner the benefits on output and 
employment materialise, the less detrimental the net effect on 
the budget should be.
57 Not all structural reforms necessarily lead to an increase in 
fiscal deficits. In a case study for four countries (the Netherlands, 
Ireland, the UK and Denmark), Annett (2007) observes that 
cutting government expenditure and labour taxes fostered 
employment, giving rise to a virtuous circle where increased 
revenue from higher employment paves the way for further tax 
cuts and continued wage moderation. Along similar lines in a 
case study for eight countries, Hauptmeier et al. (2006) find that 
ambitious reform countries reduce spending on transfers, 
subsidies and public consumption (while largely sparing 
education), where successful expenditure retrenchment is 
typically part of a comprehensive reform package that includes 
improvements in fiscal institutions as well as structural and 
other macroeconomic reforms, particularly in the labour market. 
These results stand in contrast to views put forward by IMF 
(2004) and Hoj et al. (2006), for example, which both consider 
a larger country set, and argue that budgetary consolidation 
hinders labour market reform. This suggests that there may well 
be caveats to both approaches, i.e. the cross-country analysis 
incorporating a large country set might be too generalising, 
while drawing conclusions purely from case studies that remain 
unclear about causalities risks producing rather specific 
results.
58  This would incidentally help tackle one of the major sources of 
Europe’s structural sclerosis, which is the existence of relatively 
resilient political groups composed of the main beneficiaries of 
the same rents that the reforms would abolish. Such compensation 
schemes might put serious pressure on the budget balance in the 
short term. For example, Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter 
(2004) simulate an international overlapping-generations model 
and find that individuals born between 1928 and 1982 are likely 
to end up worse off if the pay-as-you-go pension system were 
to be reformed and replaced by a partially funded scheme. These 
individuals would need to be compensated if their political 
support is needed to proceed with the reform. Roeger (2005) 
estimates that, in order to compensate those generations, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU15 may have to “increase by 80% 
of GDP over the next 40 years and would only decline 
afterwards”. 
59  Gros et al. (2004) and Beetsma and Debrun (2003). 
60  For a detailed description of the revised SGP, see ECB (2005) 
and Morris et al. (2006). 20
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means of defending increased government 
consumption that is largely unconnected to 
reform policies.61 Beside this, there are a 
number of reform measures which could 
improve the fiscal position of governments in 
the short term (e.g. privatising inefficient 
government-financed enterprises, reducing the 
regulatory barriers for new firms entering a 
market, or introducing new taxes), and thus 
would not be hindered by the SGP. Whether 
these budget-friendly reforms alone are able to 
increase potential output significantly in the 
euro area remains an open question, however. 
4.2 SOLVING  THE  STRUCTURAL  REFORM 
DEADLOCK IN EMU: ECONOMIC POLICY 
COORDINATION?
To overcome the potentially unfavourable 
effects of EMU on structural reform, Bentolila 
and Saint-Paul (2001) advocate the case for 
coordination of reforms across euro area 
countries.62 Such coordination would enable the 
ECB to induce monetary expansion in the euro 
area at the same time as all Member States are 
engaged in structural reforms, which would 
otherwise put downward pressure on prices. 
This would in effect entail applying the two-
handed approach at the euro area-wide level. 
This is also proposed by Saint-Paul and Wasmer 
(1999), who advocate that a European 
Employment Agency, which in their view would 
be the natural counterpart of the ECB, could 
first solve the coordination problem between 
national governments, and would then be 
engaged in a long-term relationship with the 
ECB, reinforcing the likelihood of a cooperative 
solution to the problem of structural reforms. 
The ECB has however argued against ex ante 
coordination with national authorities, 
contending for example that discretionary 
coordination “always gives rise to 
implementation problems and incentive 
distortions for the actors involved”, and that the 
ECB should be “shielded from possible short-
term political interests of governments” (ECB, 
2003).
Tabellini and Wyplosz (2004) point out that 
while euro area-wide coordination of structural 
reforms may be appropriate for product and 
financial markets, it does not seem the right 
approach for labour markets.63 For example, 
coordinated reform efforts may be successful in 
completing the integration of the single market 
in services, public utilities and energy, which 
requires dismantling the barriers that lead to 
market segmentation along national borders, 
liberalising markets for services to foreign 
suppliers, promoting cross-border mergers, 
putting an end to state aid and regulations that 
preclude foreign access to some markets and, 
under some circumstances, forcing divestitures 
and privatisations. Tabellini and Wyplosz 
(2004) therefore suggest that this policy area 
should be separated from the influence of 
national governments by enhancing the 
enforcement powers of European 
policymakers.
The challenge they identify is not to achieve 
market integration in labour markets, but rather 
to “remove specific distortions from each 
national labour market”. These reforms entail 
policy decisions characterised by delicate 
trade-offs between efficiency and redistribution 
that can best be made through national 
political processes. Therefore, euro area-wide 
coordination of structural reforms in labour 
markets might not be appropriate, thus limiting 
the role of the ECB and expansionary monetary 
policy in the context of the two-handed 
approach.
61  Buti (2006) argues that the reform of the SGP has, on the one 
hand, increased the Pact’s economic rationale because it 
overcomes excessive uniformity in the rules while, on the other 
hand, more complex rules could work against their enforcement 
by reducing transparency.
62  Bertola and Boeri (2002) also point out that “coordination of 
reforms […] can have an important role in overcoming 
opposition by national lobbies”. 
63 This argument is based on the idea that policy coordination 
makes sense when spillovers and external effects are involved 
(e.g., liberalisation in the EU internal market), but is 
inappropriate in fields where these do not exist to a significant 
extent, such as on labour markets.21
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After reviewing the potential benefits of 
structural reforms, this paper examined the 
existing literature in order to suggest some 
tentative explanations for the relatively limited 
progress achieved to date with the 
implementation of structural reforms. In 
particular, the political economy considerations 
reviewed start from the theory that although 
well-designed structural reforms increase 
welfare in the long run, some of these reforms 
could also generate non-negligible short-term 
costs. As a consequence, for example, structural 
reforms may not be implemented because 
politicians tend to discount the future at a 
higher rate than society. Incumbent governments 
may fear losing political support today by 
implementing reforms whose benefits may only 
materialise over a time horizon beyond the 
election cycle. In addition, widespread public 
support may be weak, as voters face relatively 
high uncertainty about the long-term effects of 
the reform.
The paper then summarised the main arguments 
in the literature on whether participation in an 
MU increases the incentives to implement 
structural reforms in individual countries. In 
particular, this literature concludes that joining 
an MU, which implies delegating monetary 
policy to a common supranational authority, 
should in the absence of an inflation bias, in 
principle provide more, not less, incentives for 
national governments to implement structural 
reforms.64 This is because in an MU, structural 
reforms increase both the equilibrium level of 
employment and the resilience of the domestic 
economy to idiosyncratic shocks, which would 
not be fully compensated by the eventual area-
wide monetary policy reaction. 
In the particular case of EMU, this argument is 
further reinforced by the possibility that a 
negative idiosyncratic shock may hit a particular 
country in a situation where the fiscal leeway to 
absorb this shock is rather small. Finally, 
greater price transparency across countries may 
reduce the monopoly rents created by structural 
rigidities, thus reducing the incentive for those 
benefiting from monopoly rents to resist 
reforms that would eliminate such rigidities. 
However, it is important to note one major 
caveat to the general conclusions reached by 
the respective literature, which focuses on the 
steady-state equilibrium of the country (or 
countries) joining an MU. While in the medium 
to long term, EMU should in principle increase 
incentives to implement structural reforms it is 
easy to imagine that upon joining an MU, and 
depending on the respective country’s starting 
position in the business cycle, participation in 
the MU may, at least temporarily, lower the 
incentives for national governments to 
implement structural reforms. For instance, by 
joining an MU with a lower inflation country or 
group of countries, the new MU member 
country could experience a decline in its 
nominal interest rate. This could boost activity 
and mask for some time the possible structural 
deficiencies hindering its long-term potential 
growth, thus eventually temporarily shielding 
its economy from structural adjustment. In fact, 
it could be argued that this is one of the reasons 
why some national governments in EMU have 
failed to acknowledge the need to implement 
structural reforms. 
In Chapter 4, the paper briefly reviewed the 
case of macroeconomic policy coordination, 
the so-called two-handed approach, which 
argues that macroeconomic stimulus is needed 
to facilitate the implementation of structural 
reforms. In the context of EMU, the main 
conclusions that emerge are that the monetary 
policy for the euro area is not the appropriate 
tool for mitigating the potential short-term 
costs of reforms or for providing incentives for 
structural reforms at the national level, for two 
reasons. First, not all structural reforms 
necessarily lead to a short-term decline in 
domestic demand, such that an easier monetary 
policy stance is warranted. For instance, reforms 
that increase competition are normally thought 
to determine an increase in both consumption 
64  For the euro area, it can safely be assumed that neither national 
authorities nor the ECB suffer from an inflation bias. 22
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and investment. This is because the decline in 
the price mark-up induced by the liberalisation 
of the production process leads to an increase 
in the real wage and to a decline in the relative 
price of capital.65 Second, different reforms 
implemented in different countries may 
eventually require different degrees of 
expansionary stimulus. The single monetary 
policy, with just one policy rate for the whole 
euro area, is by its very nature unable to play 
the role of mitigating the potentially different 
short-term regional costs of structural reforms. 
Apart from these reasons, the ECB argues 
against ex ante coordination with national 
authorities, on the grounds that discretionary 
coordination “always gives rise to 
implementation problems and incentive 
distortions for the actors involved”. In 
particular, within a policy framework of active 
monetary and fiscal policy coordination, “by 
blurring their respective responsibilities, 
policy-makers’ incentives and/or ability to 
deliver on their specific objectives are weakened 
and the possibility for the public to hold them 
accountable is diminished”. Hence, “such a 
policy framework would not be credible” and 
could make it difficult for the ECB to be 
“shielded from possible short-term political 
interests of governments”. 
A credible monetary policy can contribute to an 
environment which is conducive to welfare-
enhancing structural changes. Wage and price-
setting mechanisms may over time become 
more forward-looking, indexation to past or 
current inflation may be reduced, and the 
definition of price stability may increasingly 
guide the nominal component of wage contracts. 
All this would tend to improve the functioning 
of the supply side of the economy. Maintaining 
price stability makes it easier to distinguish 
changes in relative prices from changes in the 
general price level, thus enabling people to 
identify on the basis of relative price signals the 
areas in which structural reforms may be 
needed. In addition, maintaining price stability 
helps allocate resources to their most efficient 
use, allowing the welfare-enhancing benefits of 
structural reforms to be exploited and making 
these benefits more visible. All in all, this 
should tend to raise public acceptance and 
facilitate the political reform process. 
The ECB’s contribution to the implementation 
of structural reforms therefore takes the form of 
analysis, assessment and communication. 
Publicly divulging in a precise and balanced 
manner, and through different channels and 
fora, the expected effects for the public of 
precise reform measures might contribute to 
reducing the typically large degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the outcome of 
reforms.
Fiscal policies, which in EMU broadly remain 
under the domain of the national governments’ 
competences, may theoretically be a way to 
provide the necessary support to some structural 
reform packages by appropriately compensating 
their eventual negative effects in the short term. 
This avenue, however, is severely curtailed by 
the excessive public deficits that many euro 
area countries have suffered from in recent 
years, and which have pushed these countries’ 
public finances up against the limits imposed 
by the SGP. Moreover, this situation may 
endanger not only the support that 
macroeconomic policies can provide to reform 
efforts, but also the reform process itself, as 
some reforms may require substantial upfront 
fiscal costs. 
Some authors have suggested that the SGP 
could be reformulated to take into account the 
short-term negative impact on the fiscal budget 
of structural reforms that are expected to have 
a positive (and large) net effect on public 
finances in the long run. In this respect, the 
recent reform of the SGP partially addresses 
these concerns. The implementation of the 
Lisbon Agenda is one of the relevant factors 
that may be taken into account when deciding 
65  Quite differently, reforms that liberalise the labour market, such 
as a reduction in unemployment subsidies, are more likely to 
reduce consumption in the short term and eventually lead to a 
temporary slowdown in inflation dynamics.23
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whether a fiscal deficit that temporarily exceeds 
– but remains close to 3% of GDP – is excessive. 
Furthermore, the implementation of structural 
reforms that have direct long-term cost-saving 
effects, such as reform of pension and healthcare 
systems, can be taken into account, allowing 
Member States to deviate in the short term from 
either their medium-term budgetary objectives 
or the adjustment path towards them. 
Nevertheless, it should be made clear that there 
are reasons to be sceptical about the 
implementation of a deficit cap contingent on 
the structural reforms initiated by national 
governments. Measures of the effects of 
structural reforms are typically unavailable in 
real time, and national governments may 
therefore have an incentive to overestimate the 
costs of the reforms they are pursuing as a 
means of defending increased government 
consumption that is largely unconnected to 
reform policies. In general, fiscal discipline, 
especially during “good times”, can be very 
useful as it provides fiscal authorities with 
adequate room for manoeuvre regarding their 
support for the implementation of structural 
reforms.24
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ANNEX 1
THE INCENTIVES TO IMPLEMENT STRUCTURAL 
REFORMS IN A MONETARY UNION. THE CALMFORS 
(2001) MODEL
In this annex we present the basic equations and 
discuss the analytical solutions of the model 
proposed by Calmfors (2001), which is the 
blueprint for the arguments developed in sub-
section 3.2. 
Calmfors (2001) assumes that in a single region 
of a currency area, the inflation process is 
determined by the following equations:
uu
e =− − () +
* βπ π ε  (1)
ενµ =+ (2)
uus
* =−  δ  (3)
where  u is the actual unemployment rate 
expressed as the deviation from the equilibrium 
unemployment (u*) due to unexpected inflation. 
Furthermore, ε is an independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) white noise shock, which 
affects the region and is assumed to consist of 
a region-specific and an area component (ν) and 
(μ), respectively, where E(ν) = E(μ) = 0 and 
Var(v) + Var(μ) = σ2
v + σ2
μ = Var(ε). The variable 
s in equation (3) is a proxy for structural reforms 
that are expected to lower the equilibrium 
unemployment rate (0  ≤ s ≤ 1).66 Finally, π in 
equation (1) is a measure of actual inflation. 
In the model, the central bank of the currency 
area and the government of a representative 







In the loss function, apart from inflation and 
unemployment, which are the classic arguments 
for the central bank function, the amount of 
structural reforms, s, also appears because it is 
negatively related to the aggregate real wage. 
Hence, structural reforms have a direct cost in 
the model – because they reduce the aggregate 
real wage – but an indirect benefit, consisting 
in their ability to lower equilibrium 
unemployment (see equation 3). The model per 
se cannot account for the possible dynamics of 
structural reforms, such as the long-term effect 
of the increase in productivity that could 
eventually follow an initial period of lower real 
wages owing to the implementation of labour 
market reforms. 
Furthermore, the central bank is assumed to 
move first and to determine the “optimal” 
inflation rate that minimises its loss function. 
Once this has been determined, the government 
then decides on the “optimal” level of structural 
reforms, s, by minimising a loss function that is 
similar to that of the central bank.
Calmfors (2001) analyses the equilibrium 
outcomes of the one-shot game played by 
national governments and the central bank – 
which share the same loss function67 –  in the 
two alternative scenarios in which the country 
either does not participate in a monetary union 
(MU) (Case I), or it does (Case II), and where 
the government faces a national or a single 
monetary authority respectively. Furthermore, 
Calmfors (2001) also analyses the incentives 
for national governments to implement 
structural reforms that purely affect equilibrium 
inflation and unemployment (Case I), as 
compared to structural reforms that also impact 
on nominal wage flexibility (Case II).
66  “Structural reforms” in the model are intended as a composite 
variable that reduce the equilibrium aggregate real wage rate 
and therefore move the economy along an aggregate labour 
demand curve to lower unemployment. An example of such a 
reform could be a reduction in employment protection that 
reduces the bargaining power of the unions, thereby leading to 
both a lower real wage and an increase in the number of people 
employed. Alternatively, s could be interpreted as the share of 
unregulated sectors in the economy, where wage-setters aim for 
a lower real wage (and a lower unemployment rate, ũ - δ). If 
wage-setters in the regulated sectors aim for a higher real wage 
(and higher unemployment = ũ), equation (3) then follows. 
67  The quality of the results is also not affected if one assumes a 
more conservative central bank à la Rogoff (1985), or that s 
does not enter the central bank’s loss function. The sequential 
equilibrium, as is customary in this class of models, is found by 
backward induction, where the sequence of decisions is as 
follows: 1) s is determined; 2) expectations are formed and 
money wages are set; 3) shocks occur; and 4) monetary policy 
is decided.25
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CASE I – STRUCTURAL REFORMS THAT ONLY 
AFFECT EQUILIBRIUM EMPLOYMENT AND 
INFLATION
Solution when the country does not participate 
in an MU
Starting from the monetary policy decision, the 
central bank takes as given the structure of the 
labour market, market inflation (rational) 
expectations and the realisation of the shocks, 
and minimises equation (4) subject to constraint 









In a rational expectations equilibrium, the 
central bank chooses inflation to balance 
exactly the marginal benefit of lower 
unemployment (second term of (5)) with the 
marginal cost of higher inflation (first term of 
(5)). The first term in (5) represents one version 
of what has been defined in this class of models 
as an “inflation bias”. As expected, this 
“inflation bias”, which is the positive average 
inflation rate of the economy in the absence 
of shocks, is positively related to a) the 
equilibrium unemployment (higher benefit of 
surprise inflation); b) the responsiveness of 
unemployment to surprise inflation, β; and c) 
the unemployment-aversion parameter, λ.
Once equilibrium inflation has been determined 
according to (5), the government decides how 
many structural reforms it deems desirable. In 
doing this, it minimises a loss function like (4), 








n () ** δλ δβ λ γ
22 0  (6)
where the subscript n denotes “non-
participation”. The optimal level of s is found 
to be the level that exactly balances the gains of 
structural reforms arising from lower 
unemployment (first term) and from lower 
average inflation, the “inflation bias” (second 
term), with the direct costs of the reforms (third 
term).
Solving for equilibrium unemployment, u*, (6) 
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2  (7)
Solution when country participates in an MU
In this case, the MU is made up of n symmetric 
countries, where a common inflation rate is 
determined by a centralised central bank (CCB), 
but structural reforms are implemented by 
national governments. The CCB has a loss 
function as in (4), but defined over the average 
variables for all the participating countries. 
















   (8)
where uu n ui i
n ** =
= ∑ 1 .
Following on from the above, the national 
government of a participating country now 
decides on the optimal level of s by minimising 
(4) subject to constraints (1), (3) and (8). 
Constraint (8)  replaces (5) in the case of non-
participation. In this case, (6) becomes:
∂
∂
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When n is very large, which is equivalent to the 
case of a small country participating in the MU, 
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CASE I – DISCUSSION
Equations (9) to (10a)  show that in the case of 
the MU, the marginal gain from reforms is 
lower than in the case of non-participation, due 
to the smaller inflation bias of the CCB (second 
term of (9)), in comparison with the inflation 
bias of the national central bank (second term 
in (6)). This implies that the incentives for 
reforms in an MU are lower than they are in the 
case of non-participation, because national 
governments anticipate that reforms in their 
own country will only reduce inflation to the 
extent that it reduces aggregate unemployment, 
which is the variable the CCB reacts to.
Hence the decentralised equilibrium in this 
model is suboptimal. National governments fail 
to internalise the positive spillovers on 
aggregate unemployment that result from 
reforming the domestic labour market. Thus, 
the final outcome is that on aggregate, the level 
of reforms achieved is suboptimal. 
It should be noted that these results crucially 
hinge on the assumption that unemployment 
enters the central bank’s loss function in 
absolute (squared) levels, because this 
assumption, in turn, produces the so-called 
inflation bias. However, if the deviation of 
actual unemployment from its equilibrium 
level68 enters the central bank’s loss function, it 
can be shown that this inflation bias disappears, 
and that equilibrium unemployment is equal in 
both scenarios, as per equation (10a).69
CASE 2 – STRUCTURAL REFORMS AFFECT 
EQUILIBRIUM EMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION AS 
WELL AS NOMINAL WAGE FLEXIBILITY
The rationale for studying the effect of labour 
market reforms on nominal wage flexibility 
depends on the need to consider the benefits 
arising from higher nominal flexibility in an 
MU where, by definition, a centralised monetary 
policy cannot stabilise the economy when the 
participating countries are experiencing 
idiosyncratic shocks. To study this case, 
Calmfors (2001) exploits the interpretation of s 
provided in footnote 66. In particular, he 
assumes that in the fraction s of unregulated 
sectors, wages are (almost) fully flexible and 
wage-setters define the real wage continuously 
on the basis of realised prices and shocks. The 
fraction 1-s of regulated sectors, instead, sets 
wages on the basis of long-term agreements, 
based on the expectation of prices and shocks 
(as in Case I). Under this assumption, he shows 
that the equations governing unemployment 
dynamics, (1) and (3), are replaced by:
uus s s
e =− − − − () +− ( )() ()  δβ π π ε 11  (1a)
Equation (1a) shows that labour market reforms 
affect, as in Case I, the equilibrium level of 
unemployment (first term on the right-hand 
side), but also reduce the sensitivity of 
unemployment to inflation surprises and 
exogenous shocks (second and third terms on 
the right-hand side, respectively). The higher 
the number of “flexible” nominal wage-setters, 
the more inflation and exogenous shocks will 
be absorbed through wage renegotiations rather 
than through unemployment variations.
Solution when a country does not participate 
in an MU
When a country does not participate in an MU, 
the sequential equilibrium solution changes 
because the central bank incorporates (1a) 
rather than (1) and (3) when setting the optimal 


















Comparing (5b) with (5) clearly shows that in 
the case of perfect wage flexibility, s = 1, 
68  This implies that the central bank does not try to maximise the 
actual level of employment, but rather only smoothes its cyclical 
fluctuations.
69  Incidentally, this result helps explain why national governments 
suffering from a positive “inflation bias” may choose to join an 
MU where the central bank is perceived as not caring about 
aggregate unemployment. These governments would enjoy the 
benefits of lower inflation without the costs of the reforms that 
would be needed in order to reduce the domestic inflation bias, 
but at the price of higher unemployment.27
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monetary policy is of no use in stabilising the 
economy, as the economy fully adjusts to 
exogenous shocks. The national government, in 
turn, decides upon the optimal level of s by 
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Solution when a country participates in an MU
If a country joins an MU, the inflation rate is 
set by the CCB, which still maximises a loss 
function such as (4), but under the constraint 














**() () βπ π µ  (11)
where for simplicity it is assumed that n is very 
large, so that idiosyncratic shocks have a 
negligible effect on the aggregate average and 
the CCB only reacts to common area shocks, μ.  
ss n ui i
n
=
= ∑ 1  is the aggregate level of reforms.
Minimising (4) subject to (11) delivers the 





















which comprises an inflation bias (first term) 
and a stabilisation (second term) component.
The optimal amount of reforms, s, is set by 
national governments that minimise (4) subject 
to (1a), (2) and (8a):
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∂
























The first and third terms in (9b) are common 
to (9a), but the second and fourth terms show 
the gains in terms of lower equilibrium 
unemployment arising from higher s when the 
CCB stabilises the economy following common 
and idiosyncratic shocks, respectively. Equation 
(9b) shows that the gains are higher in case of 
symmetric shocks (fourth term), because the 
CCB does not stabilise idiosyncratic shocks. 
CASE II – DISCUSSION
Comparing (6a) and (9b) suggests that in case 
an inflation bias exists, structural reforms, s, in 
the MU could be either higher or lower than 
they would be in autarky. The ambiguity of this 
conclusion lies in the fact that in an MU, 
structural reforms increase welfare because, via 
greater wage flexibility, they  help the national 
economy absorb idiosyncratic shocks that the 
common monetary policy does not stabilise. 
However, outside the MU, when structural 
reforms foster wage flexibility and long-term 
employment, welfare increases for two different 
reasons, both contributing to lowering the 
inflation bias. First, as in Case I, expected 
employment increases and approaches the 
monetary authority’s target. Second, because of 
greater wage flexibility, the monetary authority 
will have less incentive to produce surprise 
inflation, as the employment rate reacts less to 
monetary surprises. 
If there is no inflation bias, comparison of (6a) 
and (9b) unambiguously confirms that an MU 28
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tends to generate more structural reforms. This 
can be easily seen because, in the absence of 
inflation bias, structural reforms do not affect 
inflation in the non-participation scenario. 
Hence, the second and fifth terms in (6a) 
disappear, resulting in (9b) being smaller than 
(6a).29
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